Too Little Space: Does a Zoning Regulation Violate the Second Amendment? by Lamson, Jordan
Boston College Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 8
2-23-2017
Too Little Space: Does a Zoning Regulation Violate
the Second Amendment?
Jordan Lamson
Boston College Law School, jordan.lamson@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Property Law and Real Estate
Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation




TOO LITTLE SPACE: DOES A ZONING 
REGULATION VIOLATE THE  
SECOND AMENDMENT? 
Abstract: On May 16, 2016, in Teixeira v. County of Alameda, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a zoning ordinance was not presumptively 
lawful under the Second Amendment. The court utilized the two-step analysis de-
rived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller to examine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The court remanded the 
case and recommended that the district court apply a heighted level of scrutiny—
potentially even strict scrutiny. On December 27, 2016, the Ninth Circuit ordered 
an en banc rehearing. This Comment argues that on rehearing, the Ninth Circuit 
should analyze, or recommend that the district court analyze, the zoning ordi-
nance at an intermediate scrutiny level. Intermediate scrutiny has been utilized by 
a majority of courts in Second Amendment challenges, and should be used on re-
hearing because the ordinance does not present a substantial burden to the core of 
the Second Amendment right. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the past century, counties across California have enacted a mul-
titude of zoning laws that restrict the locations where the sale of guns may oc-
cur.1 In May 2016, in Teixeira v. County of Alameda, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that the right to keep and bear arms includes the right 
to purchase and sell firearms.2 At issue in Teixeira was the constitutionality of a 
California county’s zoning ordinance that prevented a retail gun shop from open-
ing within five hundred feet of any residentially-zoned districts, schools, other 
firearms sales businesses, or establishments where liquor was sold.3 The Ninth 
Circuit determined that, despite the county’s argument that the ordinance only 
regulated where gun stores were located, the zoning ordinance was not presump-
tively lawful and it remanded the case to the lower court.4 The Ninth Circuit held 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., CATHEDRAL CITY, CAL., CODE § 5.32.040(A) (2017) (“[A] firearms dealer establish-
ment may . . . not be located within one thousand feet from a church or other religious institution, day-
care center, game arcade, halfway house, residence, residential zoned area, private or public park, 
group home, or other firearm dealer establishment.”); EL CERRITO, CAL., CODE § 6.70.100 (2016) 
(regulating that no permit for firearm sales will be given for any location which is within a residential 
zoning district, or within one thousand feet of the exterior limits of a dealer in firearms, or within two 
hundred and fifty feet of a public or private day care center or school). 
 2 Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda (Teixeira II), 822 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc 
granted, No. 13-17132, 2016 WL 7438631 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016). 
 3 Id. at 1058, 1064. 
 4 Id. at 1052, 1059–60. 
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that the ordinance would need to withstand a heightened form of scrutiny on re-
mand in order to be considered constitutional.5 Although the court provided 
guidance as to what level of scrutiny would be appropriate, it refrained from 
mandating what level the lower court should apply.6 On December 27, 2016, the 
Ninth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc.7 
This Comment argues that the appropriate level of scrutiny should be in-
termediate, which the county’s ordinance would likely survive.8 This Comment 
further contends that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Teixeira could affect a multi-
tude of future copycat litigation cases, particularly in California, challenging 
other zoning laws.9 Part I provides a background discussion of the pertinent 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, followed by the underlying facts and proce-
dural history of Teixeira.10 Part II discusses the Ninth’s Circuit analysis of the 
zoning ordinance in relation to the Second Amendment.11 Part III argues that the 
Ninth Circuit should apply intermediate scrutiny during the en banc rehearing, or 
instruct the district court to do so on remand, because the zoning ordinance does 
not severely burden individuals’ Second Amendment rights.12 
I. UNDER THE GUN: THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
HOLDING IN TEIXEIRA V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, lower courts have employed a two-part analysis in Second Amendment 
challenges.13 Section A of this Part summarizes Second Amendment jurispru-
dence, including the two-prong test taken from Heller.14 Section B outlines the 
facts and procedural history of Teixeira v. County of Alameda.15 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See id. at 1058–64 (indicating that the ordinance may be constitutional but that the county did 
not provide any justification beyond claims without support). 
 6 See id. at 1060, 1064 (explaining that, on remand, if evidence does confirm that the ordinance 
completely bans new gun stores then there should be something more exacting than intermediate scru-
tiny, but if it merely regulates store locations, intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate). 
 7 Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda (Teixeira III), No. 13-17132, 2016 WL 7438631, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 27, 2016). 
 8 See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–46 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 47–63 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 64–83 and accompanying text. 
 13 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008); see also, e.g., Jackson v. City 
& Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Like the majority of our sister circuits, 
we have discerned from Heller’s approach a two-step Second Amendment inquiry.”). 
 14 See infra notes 16–35 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 36–46 and accompanying text. 
78 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
A. A Brief Historical Analysis of Second Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall 
not be infringed.”16 In 2008, in Heller, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
regulation that banned handguns inside and outside the home and required other 
firearms to be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock, vio-
lated the Second Amendment.17 The Court undertook a lengthy analysis of the 
historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment, including 
whether the handgun regulation could be considered a longstanding prohibition 
or a presumptively lawful regulatory measure.18 After the Court determined that 
the regulation fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, the Court held 
that the regulation could not pass muster under any level of scrutiny because it 
was a severe impediment on a person’s right to possess a firearm in the home for 
use in self-defense.19 After the Heller decision, the Supreme Court in 2010, in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, held that the Second Amendment applies to the 
states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
Lower courts have interpreted Heller to suggest that a two-step analysis is 
necessary in order to determine the constitutionality of a law or regulation that 
allegedly infringes on the Second Amendment.21 If the challenged law does in 
                                                                                                                           
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 17 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–76. 
 18 See id. at 576–627 (interpreting the lengthy historical record to determine the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment, and further implying that longstanding prohibitions or presumptively lawful regula-
tory measures can be considered limitations that exist on the right to bear arms). 
 19 See id. at 628–29. The Court considered the regulation to be such a severe restriction because 
the regulation was preventing the “inherent right of self-defense [that] has been central to the Second 
Amendment” and therefore it could not pass under any level of scrutiny. Id. 
 20 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749 (2010); see Reed Harasimowicz, Comment, 
The Comfort of Home: Why Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego’s Extension of Second Amendment Rights 
Goes Beyond the Scope Envisioned by the Supreme Court, 56 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 51, 53 (2015), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3436&context=bclr 
[https://perma.cc/Q2JC-J9RS] (describing McDonald’s holding that the Second Amendment applies 
to the states). In the McDonald case, the petitioner, a Chicago resident, wanted to keep a handgun in 
his home, but was prevented from doing so by a Chicago ordinance. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. Part 
of petitioner’s argument was that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id. at 753. The Supreme Court agreed, deciding that the 
Second Amendment rights, as the Court recognized them in Heller, were applicable to the States. Id. 
at 748, 791. 
 21 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960 (“[T]he two-step inquiry we have adopted ‘(1) asks whether 
the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment and (2) if so, directs courts 
to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.’”) (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 
(9th Cir. 2013)); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136 (adopting the two-step Second Amendment inquiry, re-
flecting the holding in Heller); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (conclud-
ing that the two-step approach from Heller is appropriate for Second Amendment inquiries); Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 
(5th Cir. 2012) (adopting Heller’s two-step inquiry); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 
(7th Cir. 2011) (applying Heller’s two-step inquiry); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d 
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fact burden conduct that falls within the purview of the Second Amendment, the 
court then performs the second step of the Heller test by applying an appropriate 
level of scrutiny to determine whether that burden is constitutional.22 
1. Application of the First Prong of the Heller Analysis 
In applying the first step of the test derived from Heller, courts review the 
historical context of the Second Amendment in order to determine whether the 
right affected by a law is within the scope of the Second Amendment.23 The es-
sential question therein is whether the law does or does not interfere with the 
right to bear arms as it was understood at the time of the Amendment’s adop-
tion.24 Within this assessment, courts have recognized that certain laws or regu-
lations are lawful if they can be considered part of “longstanding restrictions or 
prohibitions” that have been historically accepted.25 Some examples cited by 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2010) (interpreting a two-step inquiry from Heller’s holding); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 
792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Heller’s two-step inquiry); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 
673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the two-step inquiry is appropriate for Second Amendment 
inquiries). 
 22 See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136 (implying that the rationale behind the first step reflects Heller’s 
holding that the scope of the Second Amendment is not unlimited, but that certain regulations can 
permissibly burden the protections afforded by the Second Amendment); see also Jackson, 746 F.3d 
at 960 (providing the two-step Second Amendment analysis and its analog to the First Amendment 
context); Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scru-
tiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2011) (discussing the lower 
courts’ struggles in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny in the wake of the Heller decision). 
 23 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 963 (holding that the ammunition and firearm regulations did 
fall within the scope of the Second Amendment based on historical evidence); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1137 (holding that a regulation restricting the right to possess firearms of persons convicted of a do-
mestic violence offense fell within the scope of the Second Amendment based on the lack of historical 
evidence to suggest otherwise). 
 24 Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 929–33, 939 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for 
cert. docketed, Peruta, et al. v. California, et al., No. 16-894 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2017) (concluding that the 
historical analysis of the Second Amendment right does not include the right of a member of the gen-
eral public to carry a concealed firearm because based upon a historical analysis of the laws of both 
England and the United States, governments have long been able to prohibit the use of concealed 
carry), with Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (concluding that there was a lack of historical evidence indicat-
ing that persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors had their rights limited, and therefore 
those persons are assumed to still have Second Amendment rights). 
 25 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (explaining that the Court’s opinion should not raise 
doubts about the constitutionality of certain longstanding prohibitions that limit the Second Amend-
ment); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (explaining that “presumptively lawful” could mean that the chal-
lenged regulations are outside the scope of the Second Amendment analysis, or that they would “pass 
muster” under any standard of scrutiny); see also Matthew Gamsin, Note, The New York Safe Act: A 
Thoughtful Approach to Gun Control, or a Politically Expedient Response to the Public’s Fear of the 
Mentally Ill?, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 16, 28 n.62 (2015), http://lawreview.usc.edu/postscript/
view/download/?id=1000037 [https://perma.cc/8DTD-4EVA] (“The prevailing view is that a ‘longstand-
ing prohibition’ is presumptively lawful because the conduct regulated ‘is not within the scope of the 
Second Amendment’ and a challenge therefore fails the first step of a constitutional analysis because 
80 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
courts include preventing felons from possessing firearms and the prohibition on 
carrying firearms in governmental buildings.26 If the court finds that the law con-
flicts with the historical understanding of the Second Amendment, the court then 
performs the second part of the test, which is to determine the appropriate level 
of scrutiny.27 
2. Application of the Second Prong of the Heller Analysis 
In constitutional jurisprudence, various levels of scrutiny are applied by 
courts in different contexts to determine whether a law or regulation passes con-
stitutional muster—the most prevalent being rational basis, intermediate scruti-
ny, and strict scrutiny.28 For a regulation to survive rational basis review, all that 
needs to be shown is a rational relationship between a permissible state goal and 
the means by which the regulations seeks to achieve that goal.29 When a regula-
                                                                                                                           
the prohibition does not burden rights protected by the Second Amendment.”) (quoting Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431–34 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 26 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (indicating that although not an exhaustive list, there are 
longstanding regulations relating to the Second Amendment, including forbidding the possession of 
firearms from felons or the mentally ill, preventing firearms in schools or governmental buildings, and 
conditions and qualifications on the sale of firearms); see also Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (concluding 
that prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms is not part of the long-
lasting presumptively lawful regulations that have prohibited other offenders from possessing fire-
arms, such as those convicted of murder, manslaughter, rape, and other violent crimes); Hightower v. 
City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2012) (providing that the licensure of carrying concealed 
firearms is a presumptively lawful regulation). 
 27 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961–65 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1136–38 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680–83 (applying intermediate scruti-
ny). 
 28 See Stephen Kiehl, Note, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDon-
ald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1145–49 (2011) (examining the various levels of scrutiny). Rational basis, 
which is the lowest basis of scrutiny, seldom results in a finding of unconstitutionality because it is an 
extremely deferential standard. Andrew Peace, Comment, A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why Dec-
astro’s Substantial Burden Standard Is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 175, 178 (2013), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3304&context=bclr 
[https://perma.cc/W3H7-8RLY]. Strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of scrutiny, requires 
that a regulation be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest.” See, e.g., 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (defining strict scrutiny). Inter-
mediate scrutiny falls somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny and requires that there is a 
“reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and a substantial governmental objective.” Chester, 
628 F.3d at 682–83 (defining intermediate scrutiny); see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 (“[Intermediate 
scrutiny] standards differ in precise terminology, [but] they essentially share the same substantive 
requirements. They all require the asserted governmental end to be more than just legitimate, either 
‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important.’”). 
 29 See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (defining rational basis 
and indicating that in general commercial transactions, rational basis is more appropriate, but it is not 
appropriate in cases involving fundamental rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) 
(holding that restrictions on sexual conduct are analyzed under a rational basis review); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (reviewing a ban on assisted suicide under rational basis scruti-
ny); F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 307 (1993) (holding that in areas of social or 
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tion or law allegedly restricts gun use or gun ownership, thereby implicating the 
Second Amendment, a majority of circuit courts have applied a heighted level of 
review akin to intermediate scrutiny.30 Intermediate scrutiny has generally been 
the favorite among circuit and lower courts because it creates a balance between 
a constitutionally enumerated right and Heller’s presumption toward lawful reg-
ulation.31 
When determining the specific standard of scrutiny in Second Amendment 
challenges, the Ninth Circuit, and several sister circuits, apply a two-part analy-
sis.32 First, the circuits analyze the law or regulation’s proximity to the core of 
the Second Amendment right and second, how severely the law burdens that 
right.33 In examining the law’s proximity to the core of the Second Amendment, 
many courts use Heller’s holding that the “core” of the Second Amendment is 
the right of law-abiding citizens to use firearms in self-defense of their home.34 
                                                                                                                           
economic policy, statutes are analyzed under rational basis review if they do not infringe on funda-
mental constitutional rights or suspect lines). 
 30 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and 
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitu-
tional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”); Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 (conclud-
ing that a heightened scrutiny level should apply when a law implicates the Second Amendment); 
Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (rejecting rational basis and indicating that some form of heightened scruti-
ny is necessary); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703 (concluding that some form of heightened scrutiny is re-
quired); Reese, 627 F.3d at 801 (concluding that laws that implicate the Second Amendment require 
something greater than rational basis); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (concluding that a heightened level of 
scrutiny is required); see also Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1145 (stating that a “clear favorite” among 
lower courts is to apply intermediate scrutiny). 
 31 See Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1145 (explaining that one of the reasons courts have generally 
applied intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is because under Heller, strict scrutiny would 
not fit within the list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures). Courts have indicated that strict 
scrutiny, which requires a regulation to be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental 
interest,” does not square with the presumed longstanding presumptively lawful regulatory measures 
listed in Heller. Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority implicitly rejected the strict scrutiny test by approving the pre-
sumptive constitutionality of longstanding regulations, because such a premise may not be able to 
survive if strict scrutiny were applied); United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (W.D. 
Pa. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Moreover, the Court’s willingness to presume the valid-
ity of several types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with the adoption of a strict scrutiny 
standard of review.”). 
 32 See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960–61 (concluding that when determining the appropriate level of 
scrutiny, the test should be how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and 
how severe of a burden the law is on that right); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (“[T]he level of scrutiny in 
the Second Amendment context should depend on ‘the nature of the conduct being regulated and the 
degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.’”) (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). 
 33 See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960–61; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
 34 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (concluding that a statute that regulated how handguns 
should be stored in the home implicated the core of the Second Amendment); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1138 (concluding that prohibiting a person convicted of domestic violence from purchasing a gun 
does not strike at the core of the Second Amendment because such persons are not law abiding citi-
82 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
In the second part of the analysis, the courts determine how severely the law 
burdens this core right.35 
B. Facts and Procedural History of Teixeira v. County of Alameda 
In 2010, John Teixeira, Steve Nobriga, and Gary Gamaza (collectively 
“Teixeira”) formed a partnership called “Valley Guns & Ammo,” and attempted 
to open a retail gun business in Alameda County, California.36 The partnership 
planned to sell firearms, ammunition, and gun-related equipment, as well as of-
fer firearms training and gunsmith services.37 The three men decided the best 
location for their business would be in the City of San Leandro, part of unincor-
porated Alameda County.38 In order to build on the unincorporated section of 
land, Alameda County required both “superstore[s]” and “firearms sales busi-
ness[es]” to obtain conditional use permits before beginning operations.39 
Among other requirements, the County would not issue a permit to a prospective 
gun retailer until the applicant showed that “the proposed location of the busi-
ness [was] not within five hundred feet of a residentially-zoned district; elemen-
tary, middle or high school; pre-school or day care center; other firearms sales 
business; or liquor stores or establishments in which liquor is served.”40 The 
West County Board of Zoning Adjustment (the “Board”), issued a report finding 
that the proposed location for the partnership’s business was 446 feet away from 
the nearest residential property, which was too close under the County regula-
tions, and recommended against approving a variance.41 Despite that report and 
                                                                                                                           
zens); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 711 (concluding that a ban on firing ranges struck at the core of the Second 
Amendment). 
 35 Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960–61; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
 36 Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1049–50. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 1050. 
 39 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 17.54.130–
.132 (2016)). A conditional use permit allows the permit holder to use the land in a way that is other-
wise prohibited under the zoning ordinance. Guide: Applying for an Administrative Conditional Use 
Permit, ALAMEDA COUNTY GOV’T, https://www.acgov.org/cda/planning/ordinance/documents/CUP.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2UP6-WE2Y] (last visited on Jan. 31, 2017). Alameda County is divided into 
various zoning districts and zoning ordinances provide the types of uses permissible within each dis-
trict. Id. Certain uses are prohibited under the ordinances unless a conditional use permit is obtained, 
and the permit process enables the county to review certain uses on a case-by-case basis. Id. John 
Teixeira and his group satisfied all federal and state regulations in order to operate a retail gun business, 
only needing as a final step to comply with the local Alameda County Zoning Code to start their busi-
ness. Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1050. 
 40 Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
CAL., CODE §§ 17.54.130–31). The five hundred foot radius is measured “from the closest door of the 
proposed business location to the front door of any disqualifying property.” Id. 
 41 Id. at 1051. A variance is a special request for an exception from a strict application of the 
zoning ordinance based on some special circumstances that are specific to the applicant. Guide: Ap-
plying for a Variance, ALAMEDA COUNTY GOV’T, https://www.acgov.org/cda/planning/ordinance/
documents/Variance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW56-3FEK] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). John Teixeira 
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recommendation, the Board later voted to grant a variance and issue the condi-
tional use permit on December 14, 2011.42 The Board’s decision was subse-
quently appealed by a local homeowner’s association to the Alameda County 
Board of Supervisors, which voted to sustain the appeal, and Teixeira’s permit 
and variance were therefore revoked.43 
On June 25, 2012, Teixeira challenged that decision in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the county’s ordinance 
was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, and 
was impermissible under the Second Amendment, both facially and as-applied.44 
Teixeira argued that the ordinance “effectively red-lin[ed] gun stores out of ex-
istence,” and was not reasonably related to any public policy concerns.45 The 
court dismissed the challenges for failure to state a claim, and Teixeira appealed 
the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.46 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE ZONING ORDINANCE 
VIOLATED THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
In 2016, in Teixeira v. County of Alameda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit was tasked with determining whether the Second Amendment right 
to keep and bear arms includes the right to acquire and sell firearms.47 In its re-
view of Teixeira’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue as whether the 
“Second Amendment places any limits on regulating the commercial sale of fire-
arms.”48 Specifically, the court addressed whether the case implicated the Sec-
ond Amendment, and if so, which level of scrutiny to apply in assessing the con-
stitutional validity of the county’s zoning ordinance.49 
                                                                                                                           
needed a variance in addition to the conditional use permit because their proposed location was 446 
feet from a residential area, and therefore in violation of the conditional use permit requirements. See 
Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1051. Both requests were heard together at a public hearing. Id. 
 42 Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1051. The West County Board of Zoning Adjustment reasoned that 
Teixeira’s proposed location was unique because an interstate highway and other obstacles made it 
impossible for the store to be accessible by road and not be within five hundred feet of a residential 
zone. Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. The equal protection claim was based on the argument that the zoning ordinance targeted 
gun stores but did not apply to other similarly situated businesses. Id. 
 45 Id. To support this claim, Teixeira referred to a self-commissioned study that found that, due to the 
five-hundred-foot rule, there were no parcels in the unincorporated areas of Alameda County that would 
allow for a retail firearm business. Id. at 1051–52. 
 46 Id. at 1052. 
 47 Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda (Teixeira II), 822 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc 
granted, No. 13-17132, 2016 WL 7438631 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016). In Teixeira II, the court specifically 
addressed whether a zoning ordinance that limited where guns could be sold was a permissible limit to 
the Second Amendment. Id. 
 48 Id. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Teixeira’s equal protection claims, agreeing 
with the lower court’s finding that it had failed to plead a cognizable claim. Id. at 1053. 
 49 Id. at 1056. 
84 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
The court’s first step was analyzing the historical understanding of the Sec-
ond Amendment, pursuant to the framework provided in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, to determine whether or 
not the zoning ordinance burdened the right to keep and bear arms.50 According-
ly, the court concluded that the right to keep and bear arms also includes the 
right to acquire arms.51 The court reasoned that the right to keep and bear arms 
would be rendered meaningless without the right to acquire arms.52 In so doing, 
the court relied on analogous cases in which other courts have determined that 
when a right is dependent on a secondary pursuit, such as a means by which one 
can retain that right, eliminating the ability to achieve that secondary pursuit 
would render the right at issue meaningless.53 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that the ordinance necessarily burdened the right to keep and bear arms through 
its hindrance on the ability to acquire guns.54 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 1053–54 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)) (providing that 
the decision in Heller established the “broad framework” for Second Amendment challenges, and the 
first step, which is to determine whether a law burdens the Second Amendment, is to undertake an 
assessment through the view the historical record). Thus, under Heller’s framework, the essential 
question was whether the Second Amendment, as understood at the time it was enacted, included the 
right to acquire guns. See id. at 1054. 
 51 Id. at 1056. To support that conclusion, the court looked to the English law and the views of 
Thomas Jefferson as evidence that such a right has been contemplated within the Anglo-American 
tradition. Id. 1055–56. 
 52 Id. at 1055. For example, in support of its reasoning, the court cited Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 2011 concluded that a city ordinance ban-
ning shooting ranges within city limits necessarily burdened the right to keep and bear arms. Id. (cit-
ing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The right to possess firearms for 
protection implies a corresponding right to . . . maintain proficiency in their use; the core right 
wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice that make it effective.”)). The court in Teixeira 
II analogized the issue before it to the holding in Ezell and other recent Second Amendment cases, 
implying that without the means necessary to fully exercise the right to possess a firearm—to own 
bullets, or to practice shooting at gun ranges—the underlying right is rendered pointless. See id. 1055–
56 (citing Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]ithout 
bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless.”); Illinois Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of 
Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that a ban on gun sales within city 
limits would infringe upon the “most fundamental prerequisite of legal gun ownership—that of simple 
acquisition”)). 
 53 Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1055 (“One cannot truly enjoy a constitutionally protected right when 
the State is permitted to snuff out the means by which he exercises it; one cannot keep arms when the 
State prevents him from purchasing them.”). For example, the Ninth Circuit cited to the 1983 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 
where the Court held that a tax on paper and ink products violated the First Amendment because it 
necessarily burdened the right of freedom of the press. Id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)). Similarly, the court noted that laws limiting 
the distribution of contraceptives have been held to be burdensome on an individual’s right to repro-
duce. See id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977) (concluding that alt-
hough limiting the distribution of contraceptives to pharmacists is not a total ban, it did put a substan-
tial burden on a person’s right to use contraceptives)).  
 54 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the zoning ordinance was not pre-
sumptively valid because it was not the type that would be considered a 
longstanding regulation and therefore was not outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment.55 The court based this conclusion on its determination that there is 
no history of prohibitions on where firearms could be sold and that zoning ordi-
nances did not come into existence until 1916.56 The court noted, however, that 
although the ordinance did not fall under one of the longstanding or presump-
tively lawful regulation exceptions to a heightened form of scrutiny, this did not 
mean that it necessarily violated the Second Amendment; it merely meant that 
the ordinance would be subjected to the second part of the test.57 Thus, the court 
held that Alameda County would have to justify the ordinance under some form 
of a heightened level of scrutiny.58 
Having found that the zoning ordinance implicated the Second Amend-
ment, the Ninth Circuit continued onto the second prong of the Heller frame-
work to determine what level of scrutiny should be applied.59 To determine the 
level of scrutiny to apply, the court considered the separate two-part analysis.60 
Accordingly, the court first determined that the ordinance at issue struck at the 
core of the Second Amendment because an ordinance that restricts the commer-
cial sale of firearms necessarily constrains the ability of law-abiding citizens to 
acquire firearms.61 The court, however, did not address the severity of the zoning 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 1058. 
 56 Id. The court concluded that there was no showing that the zoning ordinance was of a type that 
would have been acceptable at the time the Second Amendment was enacted because the county did 
not show any historical laws that regulated where firearm sales could occur. Id. The only closely relat-
ed laws involved locations where firearms could be fired or locations where gunpowder could be 
stored. Id. 
 57 Id. (concluding that although the ordinance burdens conduct afforded by the Second Amend-
ment, it is not necessarily unconstitutional, but rather it is subjected to some form of scrutiny higher 
than rational scrutiny). The court indicated that although the ordinance may have fallen under one 
Heller exception—laws that impose conditions and qualifications on the sale of firearms—the ordi-
nance could not be considered a longstanding prohibition, and was therefore still outside of the excep-
tions. Id. 
 58 See id. (implying that the zoning ordinance may survive Second Amendment scrutiny with an 
adequate justification based on an appropriate level of scrutiny). 
 59 See id. 1058–59. 
 60 Id. at 1059 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766–68 (2010); Heller, 554 
U.S. at 635) (interpreting both Heller and the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago and stating that when assessing the appropriate level of scrutiny “we consider: (1) how close 
the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on 
the right”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2013)). 
 61 Id. (concluding that there is “no question” that the zoning ordinance burdens the right of a law-
abiding citizen to possess firearms because the ordinance would prevent that citizen from acquiring 
weapons). Compare Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (concluding that a federal statute that prohibited per-
sons with domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms did not strike at the core of the 
Second Amendment because those with misdemeanors are not law abiding citizens), with Jackson, 
746 F.3d at 964 (concluding that a law requiring gun owners to store firearms in locked containers in 
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ordinance’s burden on this core right, holding only that some unspecified level 
of heightened scrutiny should apply.62 The Ninth Circuit left the district court to 
make its own determination as to the level of scrutiny on remand; however, dur-
ing the en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit panel may decide the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.63 
III. REMAINING PRAGMATIC: THE EN BANC PANEL’S FUTURE DECISION 
During the en banc rehearing of its 2016 decision in Teixeira v. County of 
Alameda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should analyze the 
County of Alameda’s zoning ordinance using intermediate scrutiny, which would 
require the government to establish an important objective that reasonably fits 
with the ordinance.64 In the Second Amendment context, intermediate, rather 
than strict, scrutiny is appropriate either when the regulation does not strike at 
the core of the Second Amendment or when the regulation does not severely 
burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment.65 As the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged, there can be little doubt that the ordinance strikes close to the 
                                                                                                                           
their homes did come close to the core of the Second Amendment because the ability to access weap-
ons for self-defense is a core right protected by the Second Amendment). 
 62 See Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1060 (concluding that the level of scrutiny would depend on the 
accuracy of the factual assertions). Consequently, the court refrained from specifying the exact level of 
scrutiny to apply; however, the court did state that if the ordinance only regulates the permissible location 
of gun stores, rather than banning them, intermediate scrutiny would be sufficient. Id. If, however, the 
ordinance results in a complete ban on new gun stores, the court stated something higher than intermedi-
ate scrutiny is required. Id. 
 63 Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda (Teixeira III), No. 13-17132, 2016 WL 7438631, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 27, 2016)) (ordering the case to be reheard en banc); Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1064. The dissent in 
Teixeira II noted that the ordinance did not eliminate the opportunity to purchase a gun, because there 
are at least ten gun stores operating within Alameda County. Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1064 (Silverman, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent also implied that the zoning ordinance should 
not fall under the Second Amendment analysis because of Heller’s suggestion that nothing should cast 
doubt on laws “imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. 
 64 See Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda (Teixeira III), No. 13-17132, 2016 WL 7438631, at *1 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (ordering the case to be reheard en banc); see also United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding intermediate scrutiny is appropriate in Second Amendment 
cases). Intermediate scrutiny requires “(1) the government’s stated objective to be significant, substan-
tial, or important; and (2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objec-
tive.” United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 207 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a law that prohibited retail firearms dealers from selling handguns 
to individuals under the age of 21); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a law that prohibited possession of a 
handgun with an obliterated serial number). 
 65 See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a chal-
lenged law does not implicate a core Second Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden 
on the Second Amendment right, we may apply intermediate scrutiny.”); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 
(concluding that because the law did place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right, but 
did not strike the core of the Second Amendment, intermediate scrutiny was appropriate). 
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core of the Second Amendment because the right to bear arms inherently in-
cludes the right to legally procure arms.66 Intermediate scrutiny, however, is ap-
propriate because the ordinance does not impose a substantial burden on the 
right to acquire firearms.67 The zoning ordinance at issue in Teixeira does not 
effectuate a complete ban on gun stores because there are multiple retail stores 
located in Alameda County; therefore, residents of the county still have rea-
sonable opportunity buy firearms.68 Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because 
although the regulation strikes to the core of the Second Amendment, it does not 
severely limit the possession of firearms and consequently does not severely 
burden the Second Amendment right.69 
The Ninth Circuit’s guidance to the district court on the appropriate level of 
scrutiny rested on an improper stretching of case law analysis.70 The court, citing 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2011 holding in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
stated that if Alameda County ordinance resulted in a complete ban on new gun 
stores in the unincorporated area, a higher standard than intermediate scrutiny 
would be required.71 Although the two cases broadly pose analogous situations, 
the court in Ezell concluded that a scrutiny level higher than intermediate was 
necessary because the law at issue in that case prohibited all firing ranges in a 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1059 (concluding that the ordinance restricting where gun shops 
may be located clearly strikes at the core of the Second Amendment because it would hinder a law-
abiding citizen’s ability to acquire a gun). 
 67 See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470 (stating that regulations that implicate the Second Amend-
ment can result in different levels of scrutiny, and laws that regulate Second Amendment rights rather 
than restrict them have a lower level of scrutiny to overcome); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (holding 
that the statute that prohibited possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number does not 
severely burden the core right of the Second Amendment because it does not severely limit the pos-
session of firearms). 
 68 See Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1059 (implying that more facts were required to make a determina-
tion on whether the ordinance resulted in a ban for Teixeira because of the availability of other gun 
stores operating in the county). 
 69 See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257–58 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that 
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the registration laws at issue did not prevent an indi-
vidual from possessing a firearm); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (holding that the statute at issue did 
not severely burden the core of the Second Amendment because it did not severely limit the posses-
sion of firearms, and therefore applying intermediate scrutiny). Compare Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 
(concluding that although a complete ban on firearm possession for domestic violence misdemeanants 
severely burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment, intermediate scrutiny was appropriate 
because the ban did not strike at the core of the Second Amendment), with Jackson 746 F.3d at 964–
65 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because although the regulation struck at 
the core of the Second Amendment, it did not severely burden the conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment). 
 70 See Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1060 (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding that if the ordinance resulted in a complete ban on all new gun retailers, something 
higher than intermediate scrutiny would be required)). 
 71 Id. (citing Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708). 
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city.72 As the dissent in Teixeira noted, the zoning ordinance at issue in Alameda 
does not prevent any person from buying guns in the county since there are al-
ready several other guns shops in the County.73 Unlike in Ezell, where a law-
abiding citizen was unable to use a firing range anywhere in the city, the zoning 
ordinance at issue in Teixeira does not prevent any law abiding citizen in the 
County of Alameda from possessing a gun and does not result in an outright ban 
on gun stores.74 Further, several Second Amendment cases in which courts have 
required a scrutiny level higher than intermediate involved regulations with 
blanket bans on Second Amendment rights, which is unlike the regulation at is-
sue in Teixeira.75 While the ordinance does strike at the core of the Second 
Amendment, the severity of the burden on an individual’s Second Amendment 
right is not substantial; therefore, the scrutiny level should be intermediate rather 
than strict.76 
On remand, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the County of Alameda will 
have to justify the ordinance by showing a the ordinance is substantially related 
to an important governmental interest and the zoning restrictions created by the 
ordinance.77 The County of Alameda has an important governmental interest in 
preventing harm to children and decreasing crime in residential neighborhoods.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (explaining that because the statute prohibited “law-abiding citizens” 
from “engaging in target practice,” it severely burdens the “corollary to the meaningful exercise of the 
core right to possess firearms for self-defense”); see also supra note 52 (describing the facts and hold-
ing of Ezell). 
 73 Teixeira II, 822 F.3d at 1064 (Silverman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
first amended complaint does not explain how Alameda County’s zoning ordinance, on its face or as 
applied, impairs any actual person’s individual right to bear arms, no matter what level of scrutiny is 
applied.”). 
 74 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate because none of the registration requirements at issue 
prevented a law-abiding citizen from possessing a firearm); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (concluding 
that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the statute at issue was “more accurately character-
ized as a regulation of the manner in which persons may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment 
rights” because it did not have “the effect of prohibiting the possession of any class of firearms”). 
 75 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying a higher level of scrutiny 
because the regulation was a blanket prohibition on carrying a gun in public); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 
(applying a higher level of scrutiny than intermediate because the ordinance at issue completely 
banned individuals from practicing at the firing range). 
 76 See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (concluding that in the analysis of the severity of the burden, an 
important consideration is whether the ordinance burdens the “manner in which persons may exer-
cise” the right, which would likely result in intermediate scrutiny, or whether it effectuates a blanket 
ban, which would result in a higher level of scrutiny). In Teixeira, the ordinance regulates rather than 
prohibits an individual’s ability to acquire a gun and therefore intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. 
See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (contrasting mere regulation from outright prohibition). 
 77 See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny requires the gov-
ernment objective to be significant, substantial, or important and be reasonable); Chester, 628 F.3d at 
683 (concluding that, under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that there is a reasona-
ble fit between a significant governmental objective and the regulation challenged). 
 78 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (concluding that protecting the community 
from crime is a “legitimate and compelling state interest”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 
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The County should be able to justify their zoning ordinance, but it will need to 
show supporting evidence that prohibiting a gun store within five hundred feet of 
any residential area, school, or other specified establishment is reasonably relat-
ed to their governmental objective.79 
The outcome of this case could produce similar litigation both in California 
and in other states where local zoning ordinances prevent commercial gun stores 
from operating within certain distinguished buffer zones.80 For example, there 
are at least twenty California cities and counties that have enacted similar zoning 
ordinances that restrict the commercial sale of firearms.81 Teixeira, therefore, 
could have a substantial impact on zoning laws across the nation if on rehearing 
the Ninth Circuit finds that any zoning ordinance that prevents a commercial gun 
store from opening in a certain part of town is unconstitutional.82 The court 
should be cognizant of the vast implications of distance-based zoning ordinanc-
es, and if it does in fact strike down the County of Alameda’s ordinance, it 
should do so in a way that provides guidance to legislatures for writing similar 
regulations.83 
                                                                                                                           
(1982) (“Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional 
well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protect-
ed rights.”); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 877 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the protection 
of public safety and preventing crime were substantial government interests). 
 79 See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 969 (stating that while determining whether the government interest 
was substantial that a municipality may rely on any evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant”); cf. 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (stating, in a case involving adult 
movie theaters, that the “essence of zoning” is “preserving the quality of life in the community at 
large” by preventing what the government feels is a harm to the community). 
 80 See Matthew Henderson, In the Crosshairs of the Second Amendment—Ninth Circuit Finds 
County Zoning Regime Was Overly Restrictive on the Sale of Firearms, ARGENT COMMS. GROUP., 
(July 15, 2016), https://argentco.com/post/crosshairs-second-amendment-ninth-circuit-finds-county-
zoning-regime-overly-restrictive-sale-firearms [https://perma.cc/MLW6-VG9K] (explaining that the 
ruling in Teixeira could produce copycat litigation throughout California). 
 81 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence & Youth Alive! in Support of 
Defendants Appellees and Affirmance at 4, n.7, Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 
2016) (No. 13-17132), 2014 WL 4198123, at *4, 4 n.7 (listing twenty different local ordinances regu-
lating where firearms stores may be located). There is therefore no shortage of local laws regulating 
the location of gun retailers in California for potential copycat litigators to direct their constitutional 
challenges. See, e.g., CATHEDRAL CITY, CAL., CODE § 5.32.040(A) (2017); ALBANY, CAL., CODE 
§ 8-19.6(I)(3) (2016); BURBANK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1-673.1(A)(2) (2016); EL CERRITO, 
CAL., CODE § 6.70.100 (2016); HERCULES, CAL., CODE § 4-14-06(I)(3) (2016); OAKLAND, CAL., 
CODE § 5.26.070(I)(3) (2010); PACIFICA, CAL., CODE § 9-4.2316(d) (2005); PALO ALTO, CAL., MU-
NICIPAL CODE § 4.57.050(a)(9)(C) (1996). 
 82 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence & Youth Alive! in Support of 
Defendants Appellees and Affirmance, supra note 81, at 4 (indicating the prevalence of local zoning 
regulations involving gun retailers across California); Henderson, supra note 80 (suggesting that the 
outcome of Teixeira could encourage an increase in litigation attacking the constitutionality of zoning 
ordinances regulating the location of gun retailers). 
 83 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence & Youth Alive! in Support of 
Defendants Appellees and Affirmance, supra note 81, at 4 (highlighting the prevalence of distance-
based zoning ordinances); Henderson, supra note 80 (discussing the potential implications of Teixeira 
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CONCLUSION 
In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Teixeira v. 
County of Alameda was required to decide whether a zoning ordinance, which 
prohibited a commercial gun shop from opening within five hundred feet of any 
residential district, school, other gun store, or establishment that sold liquor, was 
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The Ninth Circuit correctly en-
gaged in a two-step analysis to determine whether the zoning ordinance violated 
the Second Amendment. Under the first step, the zoning ordinance does burden 
conduct under the Second Amendment because it does have some form of re-
striction on the right to sell guns, which is a complementary Second Amendment 
right of individuals to acquire guns. However, under the second step, the zoning 
ordinance should only face intermediate scrutiny because although the ordinance 
strikes to the core of the Second Amendment, it does not severely burden the 
right to keep and bear arms for individuals in the community. No law-abiding 
citizens in the community were less able to buy a gun than they were before the 
ordinance. Therefore, on rehearing, if the Ninth Circuit rules in favor of Teixeira 
and strikes down the ordinance, the effect could be a potentially large increase in 
the number of constitutional challenges to zoning laws throughout the United 
States. 
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II); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (striking down a town’s ordinance 
as unconstitutional, but making sure to provide guidance to governments on how to write an ordinance 
that would have survived the Court’s constitutional scrutiny). 
